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Director of
Central Intelligence

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Intelligence Consumer Survey (U)

Intelligence Producers Council

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Preface

One way to measure how well we in the Intelligence Community are responding to the needs of our customers is to ask them. This report is based on the data from the most recent survey of intelligence consumers. It is also the only such survey conducted on a Community basis. Some 133 senior policymakers from the later years of the Carter administration completed the survey questionnaire. Of these respondents, 36 also participated in personal interviews. These activities provided the data from which were derived the findings reported here.

A continuing effort must be made to improve our understanding of consumer needs and to assure that our response to those needs is the best possible. This report provides some meaningful insights in this regard. But the mere gathering of these data is not enough. Each intelligence agency, manager, and analyst must put forth the effort to understand the import of these findings in the context of his own responsibilities; to understand what the consumers need, and cannot use; and to plan and conduct the intelligence production effort to be responsive.

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Intelligence Consumer Survey (U)

Key Judgments

The Consumer Survey is the first Intelligence Community investigation of how senior policymakers value and use intelligence products. The Survey queried 154 senior officials that served in the Carter administration, 133 of whom returned the questionnaire and completed the essay responses. Subsequently, 36 were interviewed by members of the Consumer Survey Working Group.

The major findings of the Survey, based on analysis of data from the questionnaires, essays, and interviews, show:

- Senior policymakers tended to know relatively little about intelligence or the intelligence process and relied on staffs or internal intelligence offices to obtain and present the products they needed.
- Systems developed by intelligence managers to determine policymakers' needs did not always work well and sometimes prevented policymakers from articulating their requirements. Delivery systems sometimes created delays in providing intelligence products to policymakers on a timely basis.
- Senior policymakers at State, Defense, and the NSC were regular users of intelligence and were often influenced by it; but in other agencies, intelligence products were not as well received or read.
- Policymakers valued current intelligence but were often critical of analytic and estimative products or intelligence directly related to policy issues.
- Policymakers were generally satisfied with the quantity of materials they received, but they complained that some products were not relevant, not timely, and therefore, not useful.
- The producer-consumer relationship had a direct bearing on the extent to which policymakers were satisfied with intelligence. Policy officials often preferred to deal directly with analysts or experts, but they indicated that the initiative in establishing relations was up to producers.

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The Consumer Survey Working Group collated recommendations from respondents and from its own data. To correct the problems surfaced in the Survey, it recommends that intelligence managers:

- Develop a program to educate policymakers about intelligence.
- Develop more flexible and responsive arrangements whereby the consumers can task the Intelligence Community.
- Clarify the role of the NIO/DIO/NSIO.
- Improve distribution and delivery systems.

Intelligence producers should improve the quality and utility of products by:

- Developing terms of reference for analysis in consultation with policymakers.
- Eliminating levels of review that fail to enhance the product.
- Improving presentation of precis, key judgments, and summaries for the most senior officials.
- Determining if self-initiated products are meeting the needs of consumers.

Because the producer-consumer relationship is so critical, intelligence managers should:

- Ensure direct contact between analysts, supervisors, and managers with key consumers.

Finally, the Working Group recommends that periodic Community surveys be undertaken to determine:

- If the requirements for intelligence and uses of intelligence by policymakers have changed over time.
- If specific changes made in intelligence systems have produced the desired effects.

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Intelligence Consumer Survey (U)

Background

There have been several attempts in the past 10 years to survey intelligence consumers on how well they were served by the Intelligence Community or its product. These attempts, unfortunately, did not have much impact on either the intelligence producers or their consumers. In late 1980, members of the Resource Management Staff (RMS) embarked on an effort to survey key policymakers dealing with Third World issues. They wished to interview as many outgoing members of the Carter administration as possible, devised a limited questionnaire, and delivered it to about a dozen intelligence users.

In January 1981, it was apparent that the RMS project was a major undertaking. The Director of RMS and the Director of the National Foreign Assessment Center (NFAC) agreed to continue the project under the aegis of the Interagency Working Group on Intelligence Production.

In the ensuing months, the Working Group on the Consumer Survey formulated a project that went considerably beyond the original RMS effort. The purpose of the project was to provide intelligence production managers with consumer perceptions of the value of the intelligence product. The plan was to survey national policymakers using a broad questionnaire with a series of related multiple-choice and essay questions, followed by personal interviews of selected respondents to the questionnaire.

The Working Group constructed the questionnaire with the help of OMS psychologists to ensure that the responses would be valid and suitable for analysis by appropriate software and statistical procedures. The final questionnaire, which was coordinated with many intelligence managers throughout the producing community, contained multiple-choice and essay questions. The multiple-choice questions together with the aggregate answers are contained in appendix A.

The selection criteria of the policymakers to be sampled were relatively simple:

- Policymakers had to be deputy assistant secretaries, equivalents, or above, incumbent during the Carter administration. (A list of participants is contained in appendix B.)
- They had to be national policymakers.
- They had to be recipients of intelligence from more agencies than their own.

The Working Group selected 154 policymakers to survey, and in June 1981, began hand-delivering the questionnaires accompanied by a letter from the DCI requesting participation in the project. By August 133 responses had been returned.

The selection criteria for the personal interview phase of the project was more complex. It entailed examination of the multiple-choice responses for anomalies, intelligence gaps, and extremes of satisfaction or dissatisfaction. Each completed questionnaire was evaluated using a computer algorithm that considered all this information in addition to the respondent's willingness to participate in a followup interview. This resulted in 36 interviews.

Findings

An analysis of the data obtained in this project enables us to cite a series of important findings. These major findings reveal some important lessons about the quality and utility of intelligence to national-level policymakers.

The Consumer

Senior policymakers—at the Deputy Assistant Secretary level and above—are the most important customers of national intelligence. This is the group on which the Consumer Survey focused—consumers of finished intelligence. The Consumer Survey also confirmed

that senior officials in the national security decision-making system—the NSC Staff, State, and Defense—were the heaviest recipients of intelligence and generally the heaviest users. There was a second echelon of users at Treasury, Commerce, and Energy and a third level at peripheral agencies, who received a much smaller slice of intelligence and where use of intelligence was more limited. At all echelons, these officials were not necessarily aware of the full range of intelligence support available to them or received by their offices since they often did not receive intelligence products directly. Instead they obtained their intelligence from:

- Their own staffs, who selected items for them or briefed the principals and often wrote reports based on a compilation of intelligence and other material. These staff officers were *not* normally intelligence officers.
- Some kind of intelligence liaison officer or briefing team, composed of intelligence professionals, who selected material based on a continuing dialogue about consumers' needs and concerns.
- Slightly more than 50 percent of the respondents spent at least one-half hour a day reviewing intelligence; almost 70 percent claimed that intelligence frequently influenced their policy decisions; and almost half believed that they could have benefited from better intelligence in formulating policy.

What Consumers Know About Intelligence

Senior policy officials—including some who had had considerable experience in national security decision-making—consistently expressed a lack of knowledge about intelligence agencies and functions. They also expressed a desire to know more about the system that served them. Many said they would have benefited from a better introduction to intelligence when they first took office. Significantly, only a very few took the initiative to find out more about intelligence on their own.

Specifically, policymakers said that they needed to know more about:

- How they could task the system to respond to specific questions as well as general judgments or assessments on larger issues.

- How to obtain material that already existed in the system and how to find out what was available.
- How to arrange for a dialogue with individual analysts or experts.

Consumers who were served by a departmental intelligence organization knew relatively little about other production in the Intelligence Community. They depended on the agency that served them directly to provide appropriate products from all sources. They assumed that this was being done and seldom took initiatives to seek additional intelligence on their own.

Policymakers did not always recognize intelligence or understand how much they were given. Because policymakers and their staffs tried to integrate intelligence with other information they received, *the unique character of intelligence frequently became lost*. Thus, policymakers often did not realize that intelligence material was included in the papers prepared by their staffs and they found it difficult to identify or separate intelligence from other materials. Perhaps the most extreme case was one senior official who thought he had received no intelligence of value—a problem aggravated by the extent to which his staff had filtered the substantial amount of intelligence actually delivered to his office.

Tasking and Delivery Systems

The Consumer Survey sought to determine how policymakers made their needs known to intelligence producers and if they believed they were receiving what they had requested. This usually did not involve levying a specific request, but rather conveying a sufficient amount of information to intelligence producers so that they could make the right decisions about what to produce. There were problems in the production tasking mechanisms and in the delivery systems as well.

Some systems developed by intelligence managers to determine what policymakers need are not working as well as they might. Policymakers believe they have only limited ways of making their requirements known:

- Only 30 percent of senior policy officials in this study relied on the National Intelligence Officer system to levy requirements and obtain intelligence.

- An analysis of the data from DOD participants showed that the system that had been used by DIA to determine Defense Department reader requirements did not accurately reflect senior consumer needs and was not used by a large proportion of its consumers.
- Policymakers were not satisfied with the existing means of tasking intelligence collectors and producers.¹
- Almost 70 percent of senior policy officials relied on their staff or intelligence liaison to task intelligence producers, and it appears that this system tended to "filter" requirements and create, in part, the disparity between what senior officials needed and what intelligence analysts provided.
- The desire of policy officials to have better, more frequent and more direct access to analysts was one of the most consistent and strongly expressed observations made in the survey. Policymakers indicated that they desired the opportunity to have direct contact with expert analysts—as distinct from intelligence managers—both to obtain information and to explore various facets of a subject.
- Some policymakers reported that working through liaison groups was the most effective way to arrange briefings or dialogue with the working level analysts, and thus obtain the most relevant information.

The combination of filters between policymaker and analyst, inefficiencies in established requirements mechanisms, and general ignorance about the inner workings of intelligence resulted in a system that made it difficult for policymakers to articulate their requirements in terms meaningful to intelligence producers. This system also inhibited producers' understanding of what products would be most relevant and useful.

¹ Even though no specific questions were asked regarding the National Intelligence Topics (NITs), it may be significant that in the essays and interviews, NITs were not cited as an effective means of making the intelligence needs of policymakers known to intelligence producers and collectors.

There were mechanical problems in the intelligence delivery system. Intelligence officials at the Deputy Assistant Secretary level or higher rarely read intelligence products without an initial screening by a staff officer. Further, staffs generally sought to condense material for their often-harried bosses. This screening system was even more restrictive for sensitive or codeword material. Such products required handling by special couriers, reading in special facilities, or storage in specially secured areas. Thus, sensitive or codeword reports often were not read or, if read, were not used.

Other problems uncovered in this area include:

- A reliance on liaison or staffs to obtain the appropriate material from existing stocks of intelligence products, but a realization that staffs, and sometimes liaison, were often unaware of what was already available.
- The lack of a feedback mechanism by which policymakers could tell intelligence producers what they thought about products. Policymakers often admitted they only had to pick up a telephone or write a note to provide such feedback, but seldom did.
- Problems with distribution lists, mail points, and delivery systems within the consumer agencies themselves that sometimes mishandled, mis-addressed, or misrouted intelligence.²

Policymakers used whatever systems were at hand to make their needs known and seldom tried to develop closer contact with intelligence producers. Where contacts had been established with NIOs or with producing components, these became institutionalized as the normal way of doing business. Policymakers often said that they would have liked a greater dialogue with the Intelligence Community, but most failed to take the initiative. They assumed that existing delivery systems had to be accepted and used. In other words, they took whatever they got.

² This information was not obtained from the consumers directly but was uncovered by the Working Group in tracking specific complaints of consumers in the essays and interviews.

Evaluation of Intelligence

General Comments. A significant number of senior policymakers—indeed an overwhelming majority of senior recipients in State, Defense, and at the NSC Staff—read intelligence regularly and almost 70 percent said that intelligence frequently influenced them in policymaking. The other side of the coin, however, is also significant. Many senior officials outside State, Defense, and the NSC Staff, while regular *recipients* of intelligence products, were not regular *readers* of intelligence. Collectively they were much less influenced by intelligence in policymaking than consumers in State, Defense, and the NSC.

In their narrative comments, policymakers stressed the need for timeliness and relevance in intelligence, and their responses to the questionnaire showed that products like the NID, DIS, or State Morning Summary were highly valued.

Since policymakers are reactive or event-oriented, it is not surprising that national-level decisionmakers valued current intelligence more highly than other kinds of products.

Consumers were consistently critical of predictive intelligence—estimative intelligence in NIEs and other publications that tended to forecast events—or intelligence directly related to ongoing policy decisions.

There were several aspects of predictive/policy intelligence that were criticized by policymakers in the survey. Consumers said they found that such material was often produced too late to be useful, frequently did not relate to the actual policy questions under review, or often was coordinated—or “watered down”—to the point where the product was not as useful as it might have been if conflicting points of view had been stated explicitly.

Consumer perceptions of raw intelligence tended to polarize around two extremes, liking and using it frequently and disliking it and not using it at all.

- Consumers received raw intelligence on a very timely basis, often at the same time as intelligence

analysts. If consumers were under heavy time pressure—in the midst of a deepening crisis, for example—they were eager to obtain raw reporting and more willing to forego analysis from intelligence producers.

- Raw intelligence was preferred by some consumers who indicated that they were quite capable of performing their own analysis.
- Many consumers who used raw intelligence noted that the volume they received was often excessive and that they had no way of separating the few useful reports from the large number they received.

Evaluation by Category. The Consumer Survey was designed to provide some insights about consumer views on the quantity and utility of intelligence in various categories, geotopical as well as functional. Because the Consumer Survey did not ask for a specific measure of satisfaction from consumers, our conclusions about satisfaction remain somewhat subjective. An empirical measure of “overall” satisfaction, however, was derived from responses to a combination of several survey items. This indicator of satisfaction provided an index for determining how well consumers thought they were being served by the Intelligence Community.

Consumer views on the quantity of intelligence were the easiest to obtain, although as noted earlier senior officials often were not aware of the total amount of material received by their staffs. Some consumers indicated that they received too much intelligence, but the interview data revealed that this complaint related primarily to raw reports. Policymakers seemed generally satisfied with the amount of current intelligence and basic data they received. Nevertheless, some 42 percent overall said that they did not get enough material directly related to policy, and 35 percent said specifically that they did not receive enough predictive or analytical material.

Senior officials who had a broad range of topical and geographic interests or responsibilities believed that coverage of the Third World needed improvement. In

contrast, those officials who had specific responsibilities related to the Third World were more satisfied with the amount of intelligence, although they noted a particular deficiency in regard to intelligence on Latin America. They blamed this shortfall on the lack of human source intelligence in the area. Analysis of the questionnaire revealed that consumers were not receiving a sufficient amount of scientific and technological intelligence, largely because of distribution rather than production problems.

Policymakers' comments about the quality of intelligence were somewhat more difficult to pin down. Consumers were satisfied with the Community's ability to digest and compress large amounts of material in current publications and they were impressed with the large volume of carefully organized data presented in basic research work. However, consumers faulted the Community for the quality of its analysis. Criticism ranged from a lack of cogent, thoughtful judgment to an inability to assess reasonable alternative outcomes of events. Beyond this, the respondents could offer few ideas about how to improve the quality of analysis.

In the interviews, policymakers noted—in contrast to their criticisms of published material—that they were impressed with the expertise of intelligence analysts in those situations where they were able to deal with them directly. Thus, briefings and oral presentations received high marks in terms of quality, and policymakers were obviously impressed with the flexibility and depth of knowledge of Community analysts. An analysis of the data on the quality of intelligence by region yielded few surprises. Intelligence on the USSR and Europe was rated high in quality; intelligence on the Third World ranked much lower. Similarly, the quality of military intelligence received high praise, while political and economic intelligence was not considered as high in quality.

The most important factors in regard to the utility of products related to relevance, timeliness, and conciseness. Senior policy officials made it clear that they had only limited time to spend with intelligence, and that summaries, key judgment statements, or precis were extremely valuable. They also complained in interviews and in their narrative comments that papers that were too long or did not relate to an issue of

current concern were not useful. Because policymakers were "task-oriented"—that is, often caught up totally in the issue of the moment—the timing of intelligence support was critical. Intelligence products that arrived too early, or too late, were not used.

Current intelligence received the highest marks in terms of utility because it was concise, timely, and related to "front burner" issues. Policymakers also commented favorably on event-monitoring intelligence from task force operations in covering fast breaking events, and alert memos that warned of imminent events with serious consequences for the United States.

Basic intelligence—factual data, in-depth material, and descriptive intelligence—was also considered to be of great utility even though it was used more by the staff than by the policymaker. Many consumers commented that there was a need for more factual data, particularly on the Third World. Some consumers were critical of biographic reporting, complaining that it was not useful because it was static and not sufficiently comprehensive or insightful. Nevertheless, intelligence ratings of utility by both region and topic ranged from "fairly useful" to "very useful" with few exceptions.

In the interviews, the Working Group tried to determine why policymakers gave their lowest marks for utility to predictive, analytic, and policy-related intelligence. The major cause of dissatisfaction was relevance. The responses indicated a discrepancy between the materials the Intelligence Community thought the policymakers needed, and the information the policymakers actually wanted.

Evaluation by Product. The Consumer Survey defined the intelligence product to include both written intelligence materials of various kinds and oral intelligence, normally in the form of intelligence briefings. Nearly all senior policy officials who participated in the survey indicated that they usually received both oral and written intelligence and generally preferred a mix rather than reliance on only one form.

Clearly, the most widely used intelligence publications were those that contained current intelligence. A great majority—about 85 percent—of those who received the NID said they read it regularly; those who received the State Morning Summary also were steady readers of that publication. Where consumers received both, they expressed a preference for the State product because it was often more timely, more policy relevant, and its articles had more depth. Defense Department policymakers were slightly less avid readers of DIA's current intelligence—69 percent of those receiving the DIS read it regularly—but were much heavier users of current intelligence briefings. Almost everyone at the NSC Staff who received the CIA and State current intelligence products read them regularly. Consumers outside State, Defense, and the NSC Staff did not regularly receive or read current intelligence.

A second widely read—though often criticized—series of publications were those published by the National Intelligence Council—NIEs, SNIEs, IIMs, and Alert Memos. About 85 percent of the survey respondents said they received some or all of these products, and 67 percent claimed to have read them regularly. State, Defense, and the NSC Staff were heavy readers of the NIC publications; others read them less than half the time.

Other periodicals received mixed reviews and were of varying utility to consumers. The CIA's IEEW was received by about two-thirds of the survey respondents, and about half of those reported that they read it frequently; other CIA serials were read by less than half of those who received them.

Of the remaining publications—including memorandums, assessments, and research papers—CIA's were the most widely circulated, but readership at senior levels outside State, Defense, and the NSC Staff was limited. State Department publications were received and read with consistency in the Department and at the NSC, but DIA publications tended to be used mostly in DOD.

After discussing these patterns of use with the senior level policymakers we interviewed and after reviewing

the comments contained in their narratives, the Working Group concluded that:

- Senior policy officials were satisfied with current intelligence support.
- Community products were less useful if policymakers thought they had been "watered down" in their coordination or if they failed to detail areas where the Community could not agree.
- More specialized publications or material containing more depth and detail were not widely used by senior officials directly, but rather were digested for them by their staffs.

The Producer-Consumer Relationship

There was no consistent pattern to the producer-consumer relationship, either by agency or by level of responsibility. The relationship between intelligence producers and consumers directly affected the consumers perception of intelligence support. Where policymakers had good relations with intelligence producers—especially with individual analysts or where they were directly supported by a professional intelligence liaison staff that facilitated bringing analysts and consumers together—policymakers seemed to be able to make requirements known and obtain the intelligence they found useful.

Consumers expected intelligence producers to take the responsibility for establishing and maintaining the producer-consumer dialogue; policymakers often professed ignorance about how to do it themselves. If there was to be a dialogue, intelligence producers not only had to establish it, but had to keep it going. Policy officials were generally passive recipients of intelligence—along with an enormous amount of other information.

Recommendations

The Consumer Survey addressed many aspects of the intelligence producer/policy consumer relationship. During the interviews and in their essay responses, some respondents made specific recommendations to correct serious deficiencies they had identified in this relationship. The Working Group, in reviewing the data, developed a number of ideas of its own. The

recommendations outlined here represent a collation of these ideas and are designed to stimulate discussion by intelligence managers. The recommendations are aimed at improving intelligence support to the national decisionmaking apparatus; an additional recommendation concerns the utility of further surveys of this type. The bulk of these recommendations are directed toward individual intelligence managers. We recommend, moreover, the establishment of an inter-agency working group for addressing those problems that are conducive to centralized solutions.

The Consumer Survey clearly indicates that the majority of consumers are very satisfied with the support provided by the Intelligence Community. Were the Community to do no more than maintain this relative level of performance, it would more than justify its budget. There are, however, areas in which its contribution to the decisionmaking process could be improved substantially. To improve the Community's responsiveness would not be a costly undertaking, but it would require important changes in the way its production elements have grown accustomed to doing business.

The Survey suggests that the Community does best when it describes, and not nearly as well when it seeks to analyze and predict. This in effect was the message consumers were conveying in the high marks they gave to current, crisis monitoring, basic, and military intelligence, and the relatively low ratings accorded predictive/analytic intelligence directly related to policy issues.

Historically, intelligence managers have dealt with specific problems as they arose without seeking generic solutions. More comprehensive and perhaps daring approaches will be required if the Community wishes to play a greater role in the full spectrum of policy formulation.

The Working Group recommends that the Intelligence Community, as a whole, take action on a variety of issues to better serve the consumer by:

- Developing a program to educate senior policymakers and their staffs about intelligence, the intelligence

process, and the intelligence bureaucracy. This ought to be done as an administration takes office and then be continued as personnel in key positions change.

- Learning more about who actually uses the intelligence product and how products are handled in policy offices, especially outside the NSC/State/Defense cluster.
- Assuring that policymakers are aware of existing Intelligence Community bibliographic systems for publications and documents and that they know how to use them to obtain material already in print or retrieve intelligence publications—especially sensitive items—when they are needed.

Problems in tasking and delivery systems also figured significantly in the Survey. The Working Group recommends:

- Developing more flexible and responsive systems for articulating consumer needs. This would include formal mechanisms (such as the NITs and DCID 1/2), as well as informal arrangements for dialogue between the consumers and producers.
- Determining the appropriate division of labor and responsibility between the NIO/DIO/NSIO structure and the intelligence production offices. The lines of authority between these two entities are not at all clear.
- Improving communication in the tasking process. The present system has too many "filters" that often serve to change the nuance and priority of requests. Ideally, analysts and consumers ought to be able to discuss consumer requirements to ensure that the product is relevant and timely.
- Reviewing and overhauling distribution systems to ensure that customers receive the appropriate publications, that delays in mailrooms are kept to a minimum, and that codeword or other sensitive material is handled as expeditiously as possible.

The Working Group recommends that production managers also undertake efforts to improve the quality and utility of the intelligence product by:

- Improving the relevance of the analytic product by developing terms of reference in consultation with policy consumers, and by ensuring that in-depth analysis and research actually meet the needs of policymakers.
- Taking action to ensure that products arrive on policymakers' desks when they can be used.
- Eliminating levels of review that fail to enhance the quality or utility of the intelligence product.

Policymakers' comments about the utility and quantity of raw intelligence suggest that individual producers should:

- Ensure that policy consumers receive a more appropriate quantity of raw reporting suited to their individual needs, rather than a "dump" of total incoming take.

The suggestions already made in regard to overhauling distribution systems and reviewing production requirements will also contribute to improving the quality and utility of the product. In addition, however, the Working Group recommends that production managers review the existing product mix to determine:

- If some better method of presenting precis, key judgments, or summaries can be provided on a regular basis to senior officials.
- If production initiated by the Intelligence Community is meeting the needs of policymakers.

Many of the issues uncovered in the Consumer Survey derive directly from problems in the relationship between producers and consumers. The ultimate responsibility for this relationship rests with production managers at all levels. The Working Group believes that this relationship should be nurtured and enhanced. This would ensure that intelligence producers would understand more readily the needs of consumers, and policymakers would be able to make their

needs known or provide feedback more effectively. The Working Group, therefore, recommends that:

- Production managers ensure direct contact between their analysts and key consumers.
- Production supervisors and managers should be expected to establish and maintain contacts with key policy officials at appropriate levels.
- The establishment and maintenance of consumer relations should be an integral part of performance evaluations.
- The role of the NIO/DIO/NSIO be more precisely defined.


Our final recommendation relates to the desirability and utility of surveys of this kind. The Working Group recommends that this survey be replicated within the next two years, and periodically thereafter. This would serve at least two important purposes:

- It would provide intelligence producers with an empirical mechanism for gauging the effects of changes made in the intelligence products and the tasking and delivery systems.
- It would enable intelligence-producing agencies to see how requirements for intelligence and uses of intelligence fluctuate over time.

Detailed comments about future surveys are contained in appendix C.


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Appendix A



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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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


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


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
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
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Appendix B



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Appendix C

Recommendations for Future Surveys

The first survey of this magnitude invariably brings to light suggestions for methodological or procedural changes. Predictably, we have discovered that some things which were covered in this survey should have been handled quite differently, other things which were included possibly should not have been present at all, and still other things which were excluded should certainly have been included.

We believe it advisable to replicate this survey periodically. This would serve at least two important purposes. First, it would enable intelligence-producing agencies to see if problems which were identified during one administration are general and pervasive enough to carry over into other administrations. Second, and just as important, it would provide the intelligence-producing agencies with an empirical mechanism to gauge the effects of changes made in either the content or the delivery systems used for their products. Ideally, the responsibility for carrying out this type of survey should rest with a group of individuals who collectively:

- Are familiar with survey methodologies,
- Are in step with current data-analysis techniques,
- Possess the computer power and software to handle the data,
- Have no preconceived biases concerning the outcome of such a study,
- Have authority to make methodological decisions in the interest of maximizing the objectivity of the study, and,
- Are thoroughly familiar with the Intelligence Community.

The study group must work closely with a panel of senior representatives from each of the intelligence-producing agencies, so that the views and concerns of these agencies can be factored into the design and analysis of the survey instrument itself.

The study group must agree on the exact charter, purposes, goals, and objectives of the study and also on the line authority for the study so that jurisdictional questions may be resolved without unnecessary debate. It is imperative that every member of the working group know exactly:

- Who requested the survey,
- Why it was requested,
- What specific questions it should seek to answer,
- Who has responsibility for designing it and carrying it out,
- Where the final decisionmaking authority lies in the event of disagreement,
- What form the final report should take,
- For whom the final report will be written, and,
- What other mechanisms might appropriately be employed for dissemination of the results.

The fact that these were not at all times clearly understood by every member of the working group during the current effort occasionally made it difficult to progress smoothly through the various stages of the project.

In general, the methodology we adopted for this effort was a good choice and seems highly appropriate for future studies. That is, an "objective" instrument of carefully selected, structured items should be used in combination with essay items and follow-up interviews, to collect the basic data for the survey. Certainly, any future survey should attempt to collect data from as much of the entire population of policymakers as can be persuaded to participate in the effort. The issue of "sampling" the policymakers should, therefore, not surface at all.

Specific changes to be made in the items on the survey, or in the procedures and questions used in the interviews should come from members of the working

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group. Attention should be focused on any important conclusions that are *suggested* but cannot explicitly be supported by responses to particular items on the survey. Several conclusions have *suggested* themselves to the members of the current working group but cannot be reported as objective "findings" because no hard data dealing specifically with these areas was collected. The survey should be expanded to cover such topics and should be narrowed in areas that did not produce a distinct payoff insofar as the goals of the survey were concerned.

Finally, the interview phase of the study, while it produced data difficult to quantify, added immeasurably to our understanding of the real issues underlying the problems identified by the respondents in the questionnaire. Our recommendations would include a suggestion for expanding the topical scope of these interviews as well as the actual number of interviews held. With sufficient manpower, time, and resources, it may even be feasible (and certainly desirable) to interview every willing survey participant.

This appendix is ~~Confidential~~.

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